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Decade-long negotiations between the Arab 
Republic of Egypt and the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia surround the decision to build the hydroelectric 
power plant along the River Nile. For much of Ethiopia, the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents a beacon of 
prosperity. For countless Egyptians, the structure embodies 
a potential catastrophe. Grounded in threats of 
displacement for Egyptian agricultural communities, some 
have compared the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
crisis to disasters culminating in mass migration.  
 
This battle for natural resource access has 
intensified as climate change exacerbates the region’s dire 
conditions. Specifically, exhaustible resource allocation 
amid climate change indicates that regional development, 
competition, and associated conflict will increase. While 
development opportunities along the Nile may in fact 
facilitate expansive economic transformation for the region, 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam conflict illustrates 
heightening conflict between two key African states, leaving 
potential regional success in jeopardy and military combat 
a growing reality. International water law remains at the 
conflict’s forefront as governments, scholars, and 
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international organizations grapple with vital legal 
questions. The way international water law is applied to the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis will be influential 
and create powerful international legal precedent for global 
transboundary waterways. For this reason, international 
and regional bodies must acknowledge the foreseeable 
future where upstream and downstream confrontations for 
exhaustible resource-based development opportunities are 
common.  
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Along the Blue Nile in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region 
and approximately 40 kilometers east of Sudan, Ethiopia’s new Grand 
Renaissance Dam (“GERD”) seeks to generate power through two 
power stations, three spillways, and a saddle dam.1 Estimated to reach 
a height of 145 meters with a length of 1800 meters, the GERD is 
projected to store an estimated 63 billion cubic million meters of 
water.2 The hydropower plant would provide electricity to 60% of 
Ethiopians at a grand cost of 4.5 billion USD.3 As Africa’s largest dam, 
the GERD spans the Blue Nile tributary where Egypt and Ethiopia 
receive most of their water resources. Preliminary plans for 
constructing the GERD became public in March 2011, approximately 
one month after the Egyptian Mubarak regime’s collapse and just a 
month before construction commenced.4 Since the beginning of its 
construction, Egyptian leaders consistently challenged Ethiopia’s legal 
authority to construct and fill the GERD. In response, Ethiopian 
leaders cited opposing legal authority to justify their government’s 
unwavering persistence to build and fill the GERD. The GERD is 
projected to become fully operative between 2020 and 2022.5 As of 
May 2020, the GERD’s total construction had reached approximately 
73%.6  
 
1 See Aktas & Erdem, Ethiopia begins filling controversial Nile Dam, 
ANADOLU AGENCY (July 16, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-
begins-filling-controversial-nile-dam/1912030; Ker Than, Egypt Moves Forward 
with Massive Nile Dam Project, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (July 14, 2011), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/7/ethiopia-south-sudan-nile-dam-
river-water/ (The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, formerly referred to as the 
Millennium Dam and the Hidase Dam, is also referred to as the Great Renaissance 
Dam.). 
2 MWANGI S. KIMENYI & JOHN M. MBAKU, GOVERNING THE NILE RIVER 
BASIN, 107 (2015).  
3 Meron Moges-Gerbi, Tensions over Nile River dam project as heavy rain 
sows confusions, CNN (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/21/africa/ethiopia-nile-river-dam-afr-intl/index.html.   
4 Al Jazeera English, What’s behind the Egypt-Ethiopia Nile 
Dispute?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 26, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdizU0arrJ0&vl=en.  
5 See Aaron Maasho, Ethiopia expected Nile dam to be ready to start 
operation in late 2020, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
ethiopa-dam/ethiopia-expects-nile-dam-to-be-ready-to-start-operation-in-late-2020-
idUSKCN1OX0T4.  
6 Ayah Aman, Nile dam talks stall again amidst Egyptian-Ethiopian 










Both Egypt and Ethiopia have exhibited tremendous reluctance 
to reach a compromise with respect to GERD-related issues.  
Ethiopia’s timetable for filling the GERD’s reservoir and the GERD’s 
general management during droughts posed particularly tremendous 
challenges during negotiations.7 While officials in Addis Ababa argue 
that the GERD would not significantly affect the Nile’s water flow and 
instead name potential benefits to drought migration and water 
salinity, Egypt rejects such arguments and fears substantial disruption 
to Nile water access, especially for its commercial water supply.8 
Egypt has repeatedly called upon the international community to stop 
Ethiopia’s filling of the GERD.9 Powers like the United States have 
cut foreign aid from Ethiopia, which comes at little surprise given the 
strong U.S.–Egyptian alliance and robust Chinese support for the 
GERD.10 
  
As Ethiopia began filling the GERD, Egypt appealed to the 
United Nations Security Council in May 2020, arguing that Ethiopian 
intentions to fill the GERD violate Ethiopia’s obligation to respect 
international law.11 Egypt’s letter calls upon the international 
community to urge Ethiopian compliance with its obligations pursuant 
to a 2015 Declaration of Principles that compelled Egypt, Ethiopia, 
and Sudan to negotiate a comprehensive solution for the GERD’s 
filling and operation.12 The Declaration came shortly after the 
Ethiopian irrigation minister announced Ethiopia’s intention to 
commence the first stage of filling the GERD without having shared 





7 See John M. Mbaku, The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam, BROOKINGS (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-
the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 See id.  
11 Egypt sent letter about GERD crisis to UN Security Council - Foreign 
Minister, AHRAM ONLINE (May 7, 2020), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/368823/Egypt/Egypt-sent-letter-
about-GERD-crisis-to-UN-Security.aspx.  
12 Id.  










The GERD serves as a timely reminder that exhaustible natural 
resource disputes enable regional conflict between neighbors. The 
GERD conflict further elucidates the Nile’s role within Africa as a base 
of historical reliance for Egypt and beacon of hope for Ethiopia. 
However, the conflict does not merely implicate Egypt and Ethiopia; 
other nations, particularly riparian nations along the Nile, hold high 
stakes in the conflict’s outcome, especially Sudan, which also receives 
a significant portion of its water from the Blue Nile tributary to supply 
and power its nation. This Note argues that the GERD conflict could 
very well establish international legal precedent for transboundary 
waterways. As GERD-related negotiations and tensions rise along a 
transboundary riverway where climate change and poverty alleviation 
are central concerns, the likelihood for shifting the historical 
international water law framework along the Nile, and consequently 
other transboundary riverways, also increases.  
 
The Introduction of this Note has briefly summarized the recent 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis and its relationship with 
international water law. Part I discusses the River Nile’s historical and 
cultural significance to Egypt and Ethiopia to contextualize what led 
to the crisis. Part II highlights main instruments that are frequently 
applied to the crisis and universal ideas within the international legal 
framework. Part III outlines and analyzes the respective legal 
arguments both parties have used to justify their positions towards the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’s construction and filling. Part IV 
concludes by arguing that the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam could shape customary international water law by settling the 
legal principles that dictate water competition along transboundary 
riverways.  
 
I. THE RIVER NILE’S ROLE IN EGYPT & ETHIOPIA 
 
The GERD conflict highlights the undeniably essential role the 
Nile plays for many African countries. As the longest river in the 
world, the Nile flows south to north, with its drainage basin reaching 
11 countries.14 Beginning from Lake Victoria’s Nile Basin, the Nile 
flows over 4100 miles until its final destination off of Egypt’s coast 
into the Mediterranean Sea.15 The Nile contains two main streams: the 
 
14 Salam Abdulrahman, The River Nile and Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance 
Dam: challenges to Egypt’s Security Approach, 76 INT’L J. OF ENVTL. STUD. 136, 
139 (Sept. 3, 2018).  
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White Nile flowing in Uganda from Lake Victoria composing 30% of 
the Nile’s waters, and the Blue Nile flowing from Ethiopia’s Lake 
Tana composing about 60% of the Nile.16 Both streams meet near the 
Sudanese capital of Khartoum. From there, the Nile converges and 
flows downstream to Egypt.  
 
The Nile Basin Area includes Tanzania, Rwanda, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Eritrea, Egypt, Ethiopia, and portions of Burundi.17 Each Nile Basin 
country maintains its own interest in developing hydroelectric projects 
along the waterway for natural resource and energy access.  
 
As Egypt and 
Ethiopia assert their 
social, political, 
economic, and legal arguments for 
and against the GERD’s 
construction, each nation’s 
respective value for the Nile has 
become apparent. For Egypt, the 
country’s relationship with the 
Nile stretches back to its deep 
colonial roots and historical 
reliance upon the Nile for 
agriculture, commerce, and 
electricity.18 Meanwhile, 
Ethiopian desire for the GERD’s 
construction stems from the Nile’s 
role in connecting Ethiopians to 
the nation’s electric grid, 
addressing widespread poverty, and elevating Ethiopia’s geopolitical 
position in Africa.19 To grasp the origin of each party’s arguments 
fully, one must explore the underlying histories that brand the Nile as 
Egypt’s historic gift and Ethiopia’s beacon of prosperity. 
 
16 Kevin G. Wheeler et. al, Cooperative filling approaches for the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, 41 WATER INT’L 611, 613–614 (May 11, 2016).  
17 See Major Subbasins, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, 
https://nilebasin.org/media-center/maps.  
18 See Mwangi S. Kimenyi & John Mukum Mbaku, The limits of the new 
“Nile agreement”, BROOKINGS (April 28, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-
nile-agreement/. 
19 Id.  
Figure 1: The River Nile flows from south to north. 













A. Egypt’s Gift of the Nile   
 
For thousands of years, the Nile has provided Egypt with its 
main source of freshwater. Modern towns and villages in Egypt are 
situated along the Nile’s banks and its delta.20 Because Egypt’s annual 
rainfall and groundwater are extremely low, Egypt faces an alarming 
water crisis.21 With a population of approximately 370 million, the 
Nile Basin’s population includes 160 million whose livelihood relies 
upon the watercourse.22 Coupled with its water crisis and dry climate, 
Egypt’s population has grown from 23 million in 1955 to over 99 
million today.23 By 2050, the population is projected to reach 153 
million as the Nile supports approximately 95% of the country’s 
population—all of whom live within twelve miles of the Nile or its 
Delta.24  
 
The Nile’s flow across Egypt is principally controlled through 
the Aswan High Dam located in Upper Egypt where the Nile arrives 
to Egyptian territories. The Aswan High Dam provides the Egyptian 
agricultural sector with the ability to cultivate its land by taming the 
Nile’s unpredictable irrigation patterns and flooding while providing 
many Egyptian villages with electricity.25  
 
Historically, Egypt’s legal and political control over the Nile 
extends back to the nation’s historical colonial period in which it 
 
20 Richard Conniff, The Vanishing Nile: A Great River Faces a Multitude 
of Threats, YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUD. (April 6, 2017), 
https://e360.yale.edu/features/vanishing-nile-a-great-river-faces-a-multitude-of-
threats-egypt-dam.  
21 Randa Bedawy, Water resources management: alarming crisis for 
Egypt, 4 J. OF MGMT. AND SUSTAINABILITY 108, 115 (Aug. 29, 2014). 
22 See Kimenyi, supra note 18. 
23 Abdulrahman, supra note 14, at 136–37.  
24 Salam Abdulrahman, The River Nile and Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance 
Dam: challenges to Egypt’s Security Approach, 76 INT’L J. OF ENV. STUD. 136, 
136-137 (Sept. 2018); Daniel Abebe, “Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile: The 
Economics of International Water Law, University of Chicago Public Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper No. 484, (2014); Declan Walsh & Somini Sengupta, For 
Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That, THE 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/world/africa/nile-river-dam.html.  
25 See M.A. Abu-Zeid & F. Z. El-Shibini, Egypt’s High Aswan Dam, 13 
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remained under British control beginning in 1882.26 By allocating 
waters between Egypt and the Sudan without regard for other riparian 
nations’ potential access to the Nile’s waters, the British essentially 
granted the two nations a veto power over any upstream development 
projects. Using this as its legal and diplomatic basis for control over 
the waterway, Egypt built significant natural resource reliance upon 
the waters it was gifted by its former colonizers. Over the century to 
come, this reliance would become extremely dangerous and emerge as 
a recurring theme during numerous rounds of GERD conflict 
negotiations.   
 
Since 2011, the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments have 
criticized each other’s stances on the GERD’s construction. Egypt’s 
foreign policy towards the GERD has illustrated the notion that “with 
projected climate change and anticipated water shortages in such areas 
as the Middle East, northern and eastern Africa, South Asia, among 
others, water is increasingly viewed within the lens of national 
security.”27 As early as 1979, President Anwar Sadat said, “the only 
matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”28 In 2014, former 
President Mohamed Morsi indicated “all options are open” in response 
to the impending water supply threat posed by the GERD, stating that 
“if [the Nile] diminishes by one drop then blood is the other 
alternative” alluding to potential military action.29 Egyptian President 
Abdelfattah al-Sisi recently framed the GERD as a matter of life and 
death for Egyptians, stating that “the Nile is a question of life, a matter 
of existence to Egypt.”30  
 
 
26 See David J. Mentiply, The British Invasion of Egypt, 1882, E-INT’L 
RELATIONS (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.e-ir.info/2009/03/23/the-british-invasion-
of-egypt-1882/.  
27 Edith B. Weiss, The Evolution of International Environmental Law, 54 
JAPANESE Y.B. INTL. L. 1, 18 (2011).  
28 See Next on Egypt’s to-do: Ethiopia and the Nile, AL-JAZEERA (Dec. 9, 
2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/12/9/next-on-egypts-to-do-
ethiopia-and-the-nile.  
29 Egyptian warning over Ethiopia Nile dam, BBC AFRICA (June 10, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22850124.  
30 Sisi says Nile water issue a matter of life and death for Egypt, wants 
Sudan removed from terror list, AL-AHRAM ONLINE (Sept. 24, 2019), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/351461/Egypt/Politics-/Sisi-says-
Nile-water-issue-a-matter-of-life-and-de.aspx; Declan Walsh & Somini Sengupta, 
For Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That, 











For the Egyptian government, the GERD threatens a reliance 
built upon the Nile for millennia. Egyptian government studies 
estimate that for each decrease “of 1 billion cubic meters of water, 
200,000 acres of farmland would be lost” while affecting the 
livelihoods of 1 million and reducing the Aswan High Dam’s power 
generation by a third.31  Perceived as a potential catastrophe for 
Egyptians, the GERD would cut Egypt’s water supply, depending on 
the speed at which Ethiopia chooses to fill the GERD’s reservoir and 
the GERD’s management during extreme weather events. 
 
B. Ethiopia’s Beacon of Prosperity  
 
Ethiopia’s use of the Nile has been limited by Egypt’s historic 
control over the Nile as a downstream nation. Ethiopia’s population 
now exceeds more than 100 million and as its population continues to 
rise, Ethiopia’s demand for water also increases. While Ethiopia 
receives considerable amounts of precipitation measured at an average 
of 815.8 millimeters annually, climate change has disrupted 
precipitation patterns across Africa, and consequently, destabilized the 
Nile’s flow.32  
 
For many Ethiopians, the Nile provides hope for a nation to 
escape poverty by providing electricity to approximately two-thirds of 
Ethiopians who lack access.33 By building one of the largest 
hydroelectric power plants in the world along its border with Sudan, 
the GERD, as its name suggests, symbolizes a form of rebirth for 
approximately 75 million people.34 The GERD would also generate 
6,000 megawatts, which is approximately 2,000 megawatts more than 
Ethiopia’s current generating capacity, enabling Ethiopia to sell and 
export electricity.35  
 
The Ethiopian government expressed its intention to fill the 
GERD’s reservoir between the next 5 to 6 years, noting the immediate 
 
31 Death of the Nile: Egypt fears Ethiopian dam will cut into its water 
supply, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/02/death-nile-egypt-fearsethiopian-
dam-will-cut-water-supply/.  
32 Climate Change Knowledge Portal, Ethiopia – Country Context, 
WORLD BANK GROUP,  
https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia.  
33 Al Jazeera English, supra note 4.  
34 Id.  
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benefits of power generation.36 This would reduce the Nile’s flow by 
an estimated 25%, severely impacting the Egyptian economy.37 
Instead, Egypt requests that the GERD be filled over a 12 to 18-year 
timeframe citing Egypt’s need to adapt to a “huge water share deficit, 
causing the end of agricultural expansion” as well as “a possible 
reduction of the currently cultivated area, an increase of salinity in the 
northern part of the Delta, damage to potable water stations, the 
collapse of canals and drains, and environmental destabilization.”38  
 
The Nile’s significance to the Egyptian and Ethiopian 
governments differs. While Egyptians view the Nile as a staple of 
historic civilization and modern sustenance, Ethiopians envision a new 
future with the GERD as its latest technological contribution to the 
livelihood of its people. Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s battle for control over 
the Nile has only incited greater political, military, and diplomatic 
escalation. 
 
II. A MODERN INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW  
 
Humans struggle to delineate the legal boundaries that govern 
bodies of water. As an ambient resource, water does not abide by the 
boundaries drawn by the humans who seek its access. The world 
contains many examples of nations that struggle to find mutually 
beneficial terms to water supply access while at the same time 
maintaining cordial relations.39 In fact, the 246 largest rivers in the 
world flow through basins that are shared with another nation.40 This 
is also true in regions like Egypt and Ethiopia, which harbor arid and 
semi-arid lands.41 Despite its recent evolution and growth, 
 
36 See Mbaku, supra note 7. 
37 Foreign Staff, Death of the Nile: Egypt fears Ethiopian dam will cut into 
its water supply, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/02/death-nile-egypt-fearsethiopian-
dam-will-cut-water-supply/.  
38 See Randa Bedawy, supra note 66.  
39 Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Berlin rules on water resources: the new 
paradigm for international water law, World Environmental and Water Resource 
Congress, ASCE LIBR. 2 (2012), 
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/40856%28200%29250. 
40 Id.  
41 Basin Climate Zones, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE (last updated 2016-2017), 










international water law remains highly decentralized and 
institutionally underdeveloped.42  
 
Riparian nations tend to rely on highly debated legal concepts 
within international agreements to argue for river access, including 
territorial sovereignty and absolute integrity of the river.43 Upstream 
riparian nations, such as Ethiopia, often argue that absolute territorial 
sovereignty provides the legal right to access and use a river’s water 
regardless of its effect on other riparian nations.44 Meanwhile, 
downstream riparian nations like Egypt typically rely on claims that 
invoke the absolute integrity of the river, arguing that upstream 
riparian nations cannot perform actions that affect the quantity, quality, 
or flow of the watercourse.45 Of the many important international 
water law principles, two vital legal concepts that fuel GERD 
negotiations are principles of (1) reasonable and equitable utilization 
(“equitable utilization”) and (2) the duty not to cause significant harm 
(“no-harm rule”). Both principles are codified in the General 
Assembly’s United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Water Courses.46  
 
The international community coined the principle of equitable 
utilization to balance the tension between absolute territorial 
sovereignty and absolute integrity of the river.47 Equitable utilization 
provides that all co-riparian nations with a stake in an international 
watercourse may use its resources in a manner that does not disrupt 
another co-riparian nation’s interest, calling for development and use 
along the river “but in a fair and reasonable manner.”48 Employing a 
 
42 See Mark Zeitoun, The relevance of international water law to later-
developing upstream states, 40 WATER INT’L 968, 972 (2015).  
43 User’s Guide Factsheet Series: Number 10 - Theories of Resource 
Allocation, UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 1, 1 (2006), 
https://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/documents/UNWC-Fact-Sheet-10-
Theories-of-Resource-Allocation.pdf [hereinafter User’s Guide Factsheet No. 10]. 
44 See id.  




46 See Report of Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 3d 
pen. mtg. at 12, 15, U.N. Doc. A/48/738 art.  5–7 (1994). 
47 See User’s Guide Factsheet No. 10, supra note 43.   
48 Albert E. Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water 
Disputes: That of Reasonableness or that of No Harm, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635, 
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theory of limited territorial sovereignty, equitable utilization 
recognizes all riparian nations’ right to use water from a common 
source with an obligation to ensure that their use does not unreasonably 
interfere with that of another riparian nation.49 Alternatively, lower 
riparian states rely on the no-harm rule, which requires that States take 
all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other 
watercourse States through their use of the water source.50 The no-
harm rule has been defined as a widely recognized principle of 
customary international law where a State maintains an obligation to 
prevent, reduce, and control the risk of environmental harm and other 
significant harm to other watercourse States.51 Upstream riparian 
States generally oppose the no-harm rule out of fear that it could curb 
development opportunities. On the other hand, downstream States 
generally oppose equitable utilization for fear that it permits harm 
generated by upstream development that will inevitably impact 
downstream states. While customary international law embraces the 
no-harm rule, countries continue to debate the standard for equitable 
utilization often pitting the clear standard for no-harm at odds with the 
unclear standard for equitable utilization.52 
  
Although international law outlines parameters for 
transboundary riverways like the Nile, tensions between the legal 
concepts of no-harm and equitable utilization persist, demonstrating a 
chief constraint to resolving the GERD conflict. With the longest river 
in the world at its focal point, the GERD conflict’s underlying legal 
rationale retains enough influence to shift international water law’s 
historical preference from the no-harm rule to equitable utilization, or 
instead consolidate the no-harm rule as the dominant legal principle 
guiding international water law.  
 
 
49 See id.    
50 User’s Guide Factsheet Series: Number 5 - No Significant Harm Rule, 
UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 1, 1 (2006), 
https://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/documents/UNWC-Fact-Sheet-5-No-
Significant-Harm-Rule.pdf [hereinafter User’s Guide Factsheet No. 5].  
51 See Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], Rep. of the Fifty-Second Conference, 
Helsinki, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 
(Aug. 14-20, 1966) [Helsinki Rules]. 
52 See Attila M. Tanzi, The inter-relationship between no harm, equitable 
and reasonable utilisation and cooperation under international water law, 20 











International water law is largely defined in three main legal 
instruments: the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers (“Helsinki Rules”), the United Nations 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water 
Courses (“UN Watercourse Convention”), and the Berlin Rules on 
Water Resources (“Berlin Rules”). The Helsinki Rules, UN 
Watercourse Convention, and Berlin Rules recognize the challenges 
posed by an application of equitable utilization and attempt to clarify 
the factors relevant for determining the use of an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Adopted by the 
International Law Association in 2004, the Berlin Rules superseded 
the Helsinki Rules and summarize modern international customary 
water law for domestic freshwater resources and those that cross 
international borders.  Authors of the Berlin Rules noted that the 
guidelines “express rules of law as they presently stand and, to a small 
extent, rules not yet binding legal obligation,” but those that are 
budding into customary international law.53  Like equitable utilization, 
the no-harm rule was also incorporated in the Helsinki Rules and later 
reiterated in the UN Watercourse Convention and the Berlin Rules. By 
outlining non-exhaustive, relevant factors and circumstances that 
weigh in favor or against a nation’s utilization, these legal instruments 
all identify the following factors in common: geography, hydrology, 
climate, existing/past utilization, social and economic needs of riparian 
nations; populations dependent on the watercourse; and availability of 
alternative resources or uses.54  
 
A. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers  
 
Adopted by the International Law Association in August 1966, 
The Helsinki Rules serve as the foundational modern legal document 
regulating rivers crossing national boundaries.55 As one of the initial 
international legal documents to identify a need for equitable 
utilization, Article IV of the Helsinki Rules rejects a nation’s unlimited 
sovereignty to maintain “the unqualified right to utilize and dispose of 
 
53 See Berlin Rules on Water Resources, ILA (Aug. 21, 2004) (preface).  
54 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 51; Report of Sixth Committee, U.N. 
GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 3d pen. mtg. at 12, 15, U.N. Doc. A/48/738 (1994); 
ILA, Berlin Rules on Water Resources art. 13, Aug. 21, 2004 [hereinafter Berlin 
Rules]. 
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the waters of an international river flowing through its territories.”56 
Instead, the Helsinki Rules recognize that a State must consider 
economic and social needs of co-basin States, which could result in 
one basin State receiving more water than its neighbors.57 To 
determine reasonable and equitable shares of co-basin States, Article 
V outlines a list of factors to consider, such as the basin’s geography, 
hydrology, climate, past and existing utilization, and dependent 
population.58 Other factors include each basin State’s economic and 
social needs, alternatives to satisfy those economic and social needs, 
additional resource availability, and the degree to which a State’s 
needs may be met without causing substantial injury to a co-basin 
State.59  
 
While the Helsinki Rules acknowledge ideas of cooperation, 
appropriate compensation, and equitable distribution of waters, they 
lack an enforcement mechanism.60 The incredibly vague set of factors 
weighed in totality without a dispute resolution mechanism other than 
the joint agency procedure outlined in Chapter 6 of the Helsinki Rules 
creates a major dilemma for international water law: the two 
simultaneously applicable legal doctrines, equitable utilization and no-
harm, can be weaponized by multiple parties and result in a conflict 
based on riparian States’ inconsistent interests. Without objectively 
institutionalizing equitable utilization, dispute resolution institutions 
engineered by the Helsinki Rules are bound to face numerous 
obstacles. At the time of its adoption by the International Law 
Association, the Helsinki Rules were not considered binding 
international law. Nevertheless, the Helsinki Rules forged the 
beginnings of a growing body of law, leading to the UN Watercourse 
Convention and the Berlin Rules, respectively.61  
 
Since the International Law Association’s adoption of the 
Helsinki Rules, equitable utilization has become a principal tenet of 
 
56 See id.  
57 See id.  
58 Id. art. 5.  
59 See id. (The Helsinki Rules also incorporate chapters about pollution, 
navigation, timber floating, and procedures to prevent and settle disputes.); see also 
Berlin Rules, supra note 53, at 4. 
60 See Alan Nicol, The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, UNESCO, 23 
(2003), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000133301.  
61 Salman M.A. Salman, The World Bank Policy for Projects on 
International Waterways: An Historical and Legal Analysis. Justice and 










customary international water law. Despite being outlined in both the 
UN Watercourse Convention and the Berlin Rules, equitable 
utilization remains notorious for its ambiguity.62 Applying equitable 
utilization in no-harm situations generates debate and tension among 
proponents of each respective legal principle.  
 
B. United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Water Courses 
 
Rather than endorsing the Helsinki Rules, the United Nations 
requested a set of draft articles on non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses from the International Law Commission, 
which would be reworked into the General Assembly’s UN 
Watercourse Convention.63 Approved by a vote of 103 to 3 with 27 
abstentions, the UN Watercourse Convention incorporates principal 
values of international water law to curb potential conflicts, but has yet 
to be ratified by a single Nile riparian State.64 The law also has not 
evolved at the same speed as pressures surrounding natural resource 
access, particularly with climate strains in dry regions.  
 
The UN Watercourse Convention has been criticized for its 
failure to integrate environmental and ecological concerns as well as 
pertinent human rights into its body of international water law.65 The 
main drafting debate at the UN Watercourse Convention was the 
tension between equitable utilization and the no-harm rule, both of 
which the General Assembly approved.66 The UN Watercourse 
Convention codified the rule of equitable utilization and participation 
in Article 5, requiring that watercourse states utilize an international 
watercourse in “an equitable and reasonable manner” with the purpose 
of “attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits 
therefrom.”67 Under Article 5, equitable utilization must account for 
downstream nation interests and “adequate protection of the 
 
62 See e.g., Tanzi, supra note 52.  
63 See Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations Watercourses 
Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?, 32 
WATER INT’L 1, 4 (2007).  
64 See Alan Nicol, The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, UNESCO 1, 
23 (2003), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000133301; Salman, supra 
note 63, at 4. 
65 See Berlin Rules on Water Resources, supra note 53.  
66 Id. at 5.  
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watercourse.”68 Article 5 also provides that riparian States “participate 
in the use, development and protection of [the] international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner,” stipulating that 
participation includes a right to use the watercourse and duty to 
cooperate in protection and development.69  
 
The UN Watercourse Convention also observes the no-harm 
rule in Article 7, stating that riparian nations maintain a legal 
obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparian nations by 
taking “all appropriate measures” including the elimination or 
mitigation of such harm as well as potential compensation where 
appropriate.70  While crafted to be read with Articles 5 and 6, Article 
7 creates a clearer, more easily applicable legal basis for downstream 
nations who can prove that greater use or development along a 
watercourse by other riparian nations could cause significant harm to 
water use. Based on the UN Watercourse Convention, watercourse 
states must “take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of 
significant harm to other watercourse states.”71 According to the 
United Nations, the obligation to ‘take all appropriate measures’ is an 
obligation of due diligence “proportioned to the magnitude of the 
subject and to the dignity and strength of the power which is exercising 
it.”72 The no-harm rule thereby does not create an absolute ban on 
transboundary harm. Article 7(2) attempts to clarify the relationship 
between both principles, maintaining that any State causing harm to 
another must “take all appropriate measures, having due regard to the 
provisions of Article 5 and 6 to eliminate or mitigate such harm” where 
Article 5 provides that States use their waters in an equitable and 
reasonable manner and Article 6 outlines the non-exhaustive list of 
factors that should be considered when determining equitable 
utilization.73 
  
The UN Watercourse Convention’s 37 articles highlight co-
riparian obligations to share common resources, consult one another, 
protect the environment, and resolve disagreements.74 While the 
articles on environmental protection certainly extend beyond 
 
68 Id.   
69 Id.   
70 Id. art. 7.   
71 Id. art. 7(1). 
72 Id.  
73 Id. art. 7(2). 










analogous provisions within the Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourse 
Convention’s articles are limited in scope to transboundary water 
issues, refuse to include interdependent groundwater concerns, and fail 
to elucidate the relationship between the rules of equitable utilization 
and no-harm for co-riparian States in conflict.  
 
C. Berlin Rules on Water Resources 
 
The Berlin Rules serve as a progressive attempt by the 
International Law Association to reformulate the Helsinki Rules to 
integrate international environmental law and international human 
rights law. By focusing on domestic and international participatory 
water management, conjunctive management, integrated management, 
sustainability, and environmental harm,75  the Berlin Rules advance 
concepts crafted for the international and transboundary customary 
water law context: cooperation, equitable utilization, and no-harm.76  
 
Outlined in Article 11 of the Berlin Rules, the principle of 
cooperation ensures that basin States cooperate in good faith while 
managing waters for the mutual benefit of participating states.77 This 
principle is immediately followed by equitable utilization in Article 
12, which reiterates the UN Watercourse Convention’s definition of 
equitable utilization while incorporating the obligation to avoid 
causing significant harm to other basin States.78 Additionally, the 
Berlin Rules complement other factors that are considered for 
equitable utilization determinations, including sustainability of 
proposed or existing water uses and the minimization of environmental 
harm.79  
 
The Berlin Rules define the no-harm rule to ensure basin States 
refrain from acts that cause significant harm to other basin States while 
respecting each basin States right to equitable utilization of waters.80 
While the UN Watercourse Convention’s expression of the no-harm 
rule references equitable utilization as a simultaneous obligation for 
 
75 See Berlin Rules on Water Resources, art. 9, supra note 53 (These 
principles were not reflected in the Helsinki Rules and were only “developed in 
rudimentary form” in the UN Watercourse Convention.).  
76 See id. arts. 11-16.  
77 Id. art. 11.  
78 Id. art. 12. 
79 Id. art. 13. 
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States, the Berlin Rules departs from merely referencing equitable 
utilization by explicitly stating that basin States must “refrain from and 
prevent acts or omissions within their territory that cause significant 
harm to another basin State having due regard for the right of each 
basin State to make equitable and reasonable use of the waters.”81 The 
Berlin Rules illustrate a strong commitment to no-harm and equitable 
utilization obligations complementing one another; however, the gap 
between the Berlin Rules, which allow both legal concepts to coexist, 
and the actual practice of these obligations by basin States is arguably 
the leading challenge in negotiations during the GERD conflict. 
   
 
III. EQUITABLE UTILIZATION AND THE NO-HARM RULE: A 
BATTLE FOR THE RIVER NILE 
 
Conceptualizing the battle for the Nile demands adequate 
historical, legal, and political analyses. Holistic outlooks in the region 
have dictated the waterway’s allocation and use for centuries and are 
currently advanced by riparian States with interests in the river. 
Clashes often arise when international water law is applied to 
transboundary watercourses because the interrelationship between 
equitable utilization and no-harm remains unclear. This tension further 
contributes to the GERD conflict as the international community 
struggles to attribute a clear legal rationale behind the GERD’s 
construction.  
 
The GERD conflict illustrates the complex challenge that 
national, regional, and international bodies face when attempting to 
facilitate and negotiate a solution over water control. Egypt and 
Ethiopia both lay claim to the Nile on the basis of international water 
law; however, international law remains unsettled as to which claim is 
more valid than the other, if any. If constructed, filled, and operated 
successfully, the GERD provides the international legal community 
with international water law precedent that can shift international 
water law along the Nile and other transboundary waterways as 
climate change alters national demands for water. While Egyptian 
arguments appeal to the no-harm rule, prior use, and colonial and post-
colonial legal agreements, Ethiopian arguments instead advance 
equitable utilization and natural resource property ownership through 













A. Egyptian Arguments to Preserve River Nile Control 
 
Like many modern struggles for natural resource access and 
control, political influence has contributed to notable power 
imbalances. Egypt has historically justified its control over the Nile 
through legal agreements made with its former colonizer, Britain. 
Those legal agreements not only exclusively allocated the Nile’s 
waters to Egypt and Sudan, but also granted Egypt with authority over 
any upstream development projects; however, Ethiopia was not even 
party to these agreements, calling into question the validity of the legal 
authority Egypt has consistently relied upon. Egypt subsequently 
invoked its prior use of the Nile through the appropriation doctrine to 
advance its opposition to the GERD, which has largely been 
subordinated to equitable utilization. Egypt’s strongest argument to 
oppose Ethiopia’s full sovereignty to build and control the GERD 
remains through the no-harm rule, a widely accepted and codified 
principle of customary international water law. Egyptian strategy in 
GERD negotiations has recently shifted from a focus on Egyptian 
natural and historical rights to an emphasis on the no-harm rule in an 
attempt to justify circumstantial Egyptian management of the GERD.  
 
i. The No-Harm Rule & Water Scarcity  
 
Egypt’s strongest argument to sustain partial control over the 
GERD stems from the no-harm rule. Within customary international 
law, the no-harm rule requires that a State maintain its duty to prevent, 
reduce, or control environmental harm to other States.82 Codified in 
the Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourse Convention, and the Berlin 
Rules, the no-harm rule ensures that Egypt’s downstream status along 
the Nile affords it a form of protection from upstream construction that 
could potentially harm Egypt’s access to water resources.  
 
Climate change’s effects on the already dry, desert nation serve 
as a great impetus for Egypt’s arguments against GERD construction 
and Ethiopia’s exclusive GERD management. While Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed has told the United Nations General Assembly 
that Ethiopia has “no intention” of using the GERD to harm Sudan and 
Egypt, GERD negotiations have halted and remain at a bitter standstill. 
Currently, Egypt and Sudan demand that any deal be legally binding 
 






556    FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW    [Vol. XXVII 
 
  
over decisions to establish a dispute resolution mechanism for GERD-
related issues, and to designate GERD management and control during 
periods of drought and reduced rainfall.83 However, before a resolution 
among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan was reached, Ethiopia unilaterally 
began filling the GERD at approximately 5 billion cubic meters of 
water in June 2020.84  
 
Based on Egypt’s increasing demand for water and economic 
activities, rapid population growth, and attempts to tackle the impacts 
of climate change, Egypt maintains a compelling argument for 
invoking the no-harm rule. With a population of 100 million, Egypt’s 
population mostly lives along the Nile Valley, which is merely 6% of 
Egypt’s total area surrounded by desert on both sides. Based on the 
World Bank’s classification of water scarcity, Egypt meets the 
definition with a government reported figure at 550 cubic meters of 
freshwater per person annually.85 
 
However, consequential questions arise about what the no-
harm rule in practice should look like: should it be a binding legal 
arrangement between Egypt and Ethiopia that guarantees a quid pro 
quo arrangement for all parties? Would Ethiopia continue its exclusive 
authority over the GERD’s filling or would situations arise that 
warrant other parties to restrict sole Ethiopian control? Because no 
institutional framework exists to ensure the Nile Basin region is 
governed fairly, equitably, efficiently, and sustainably, failure to craft 
a legal arrangement that addresses the interplay between equitable 
utilization and no-harm could contribute to a prolonged diplomatic 
standstill. 
 
In a radical shift from his predecessors, Egyptian President 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi recently addressed the United Nations 
 
83 Michelle Nichols, Ethiopia Tells UN No Intention of Using Dam to 
Harm Egypt, Sudan, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/un-assembly-ethiopia-int/ethiopia-tells-u-n-no-
intention-of-using-dam-to-harm-egypt-sudan-idUSKCN26G33.   
84 Mohamed S. Helal, Ethiopia’s Power Play on the Nile Has Left the 
Region in a Deadlock, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2020), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/28/renaissance-dam-ethiopia-egypt-
negotiations/. 
85 Magdi Abdelhadi, Nile dam row: Egypt fumes as Ethiopia celebrates, 
BBC (July 29, 2020),  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53573154/ (The 
World Bank classifies a nation as water scarce when there is less than 1000 cubic 










announcing, “The Nile River must not be monopolized by one state. 
For Egypt the Nile Water is an existential matter. This, however, does 
not mean that we want to undermine the rights of our brothers and 
sisters, sharing with us the Nile basin.”86 Egypt’s present negotiation 
strategy is to pursue an agreement that permits Ethiopia to generate 
hydropower from the GERD while minimizing the GERD’s potential 
harm to downstream Egypt and Sudan. 
 
ii. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation  
 
Egypt has long relied on the doctrine of prior appropriation 
(“appropriation doctrine”) to develop an argument that captures its 
historical past reliance upon the Nile. The appropriation doctrine 
provides that water rights are determined by priority of beneficial 
use.87 In other words, a person, group, or State who first diverted the 
Nile for a beneficial use or purpose may acquire individual rights to 
the water, vesting the first appropriator with a recognized property 
right.  
 
The appropriation doctrine was first developed in California 
during the Colorado Silver Boom in the mid-1800s.88 Gold miners 
arriving in the United States were unable to proclaim riparian rights to 
water because they did not own any land.89 Consequently, the miners 
applied a rule that the first miner to use water productively would 
automatically maintain the right to continue using the water and to 
exclude others from its use.90 This property right vests for the 
remainder of the individual’s life allowing for continued use of the 
resource.91 However, what this principle of prior appropriation failed 
to recognize was a right of pre-emption upon unappropriated water 
supplies.92 While the first appropriator could lay claim to the water 
used, she could not lay claim to waters that “had not yet been reduced 
to possession.”93  
 
86 See Nichols, supra note 83.   
87 Jeffrey D. Azarva, Conflict on the Nile: International Water Law and 
the Elusive Effort to Create a Transboundary Water Regime in a Nile Basin, 25 
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 457, 470 (2012). 
88 David A. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in 
the Creation of Property Rights, 32-1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 3 (2005). 
89 Id. 
90 See Kimenyi, supra note 2, at 70.  
91 Id.  
92 See Azarva, supra note 87.  










The appropriation doctrine has since evolved into the rule of 
natural flow. Based on the rule of natural flow, riparian owners are 
given “the right to have water flow past the land undiminished in 
quantity or quality” where the idea of “first in time, first in right” 
applies.94 As a result, land ownership does not affect or influence water 
rights. The modern appropriation doctrine as a basis for Egyptian 
control over the GERD fails to garner robust legitimacy. As a rigid 
principle rooted in absolute claims of right, the appropriation doctrine 
has become subordinate to equitable utilization through Article 6 of 
the UN Watercourse Convention. Thus, prior appropriation is just one 
of many factors considered when assessing equitable utilization and is 
a frail justification for Egypt to secure GERD management control.  
 
iii. Natural & Historical Rights: The Nile Water Agreements 
 
Historically, Egypt has controlled the Nile drawing legal rights 
from a series of agreements with Britain called the Nile Water 
Agreements. The Nile Water Agreements are composed of two treaties: 
the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Bilateral Agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan. When negotiations were conducted for the 
1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Ethiopia was not a British colony. 
Ethiopia, or the Abyssinian Empire, was instead an independent 
sovereign polity by the time the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was 
concluded. Because Ethiopia was neither a signatory nor a participant 
in the negotiations that directly led to the initial Nile Water Agreement, 
Ethiopian government officials have steadily declined to recognize the 
validity of the Nile Water Agreements and Egypt’s claim for natural 
and historical rights over Nile waters.95  
 
Moreover, British interests in Egyptian monopolization over 
the River Nile at the commencement of the Nile Water Agreements 
remains undeniable and central to the tale of equitable natural resource 
distribution. The British’s agricultural interest in Egypt’s Nile Delta 
 
94 Maeve Flaherty, The Test on the Nile: Ethiopia and Egypt’s Conflicting 
Claims to the Nile River Waters, COLUM. POL. REV. (Nov. 12, 2020), 
http://www.cpreview.org/blog/2020/11/the-test-on-the-nile-ethiopia-and-egypts-
conflicting-claims-to-the-nile-river-waters.  










peaked during the United States Civil War.96 Most of Britain’s cotton 
supply had been produced in the United States South, which was in the 
middle of war with the United States North. As a result, the United 
States cotton famine increased British reliance upon Egyptian cotton. 
To minimize any potential disruption of its cotton supply, the British 
bolstered its foreign policy within the region to secure its economic 
dominance through the Nile Water Agreements, negatively impacting 
upstream regions.97 Britain’s unrivaled bargaining power put upstream 
riparian nations, many of which were British colonies, at a severe 
disadvantage to gain Nile access. This also resulted in Egypt’s loss in 
economic self-sufficiency with its agricultural industry transforming 
into a one-crop cotton industry, wholly dependent upon the Nile 
River’s waters.98  
 
The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty  
 
The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is a series of agreements 
exchanged between the British, representing various Nile River Basin 
countries, and Egypt & Sudan that allocated the Nile’s waters to these 
two countries.99 The agreement includes a letter from Egypt’s 
government to the British government and the Nile Commission’s 
1925 report. Within these letters, both parties recognize Sudan’s need 
for Nile water, yet the Egyptian government qualifies Sudan’s right by 
declaring Egyptian natural and historical rights. One letter specifically 
states that granting Sudan additional waters would be acceptable so 
long as it “does not infringe Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the 
waters of the Nile.”100 The agreement also constrains upstream riparian 
abilities to build along the Nile if such construction would “entail any 
prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water 
 
96 See Patrick L.O. Lumumba, The Interpretation of the 1929 Treaty and 
its Legal Relevance and Implications for the Stability of the Region, 11 AFRICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 10, 12 (2007).  
97 See id.  
98 See How the American Civil War Built Egypt’s Vaunted Cotton Industry 
and Changed the Country Forever, SMITHSONIAN (2016), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-american-civil-war-built-egypts-
vaunted-cotton-industry-and-changed-country-forever-180959967/.  
99 Exchange of Notes between His Majesty’s Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Egyptian Government in Regard to the Use of Waters of the Nile 
River for Irrigation Purposes (with Seven Diagrams), Cairo, May 7, 1929, L.N.T.S. 
2103 (1929) [hereinafter 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty]; MWANGI S. KIMENYI & 
JOHN M. MBAKU, GOVERNING THE NILE RIVER BASIN, 37.  
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arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.”101 
Ultimately, the series of agreements denied upstream nations, like 
Ethiopia, access to the Nile for actions that could negatively affect the 
Nile’s flow to downstream Egypt, including construction and 
irrigation.102 At the time, Egypt encompassed the Sudan “for the 
purpose of sharing Nile water.”103 Egypt argues that the 1929 Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty provides the nation with “exclusive proprietary rights 
to the Nile water without obligation, consent or even voluntary transfer 
of property rights from Egypt to other riparian countries.”104  
 
 
The 1959 Bilateral Agreement between Egypt and Sudan 
 
The 1959 Bilateral Agreement between Egypt and Sudan 
effectively replaced the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty by exclusively 
allocating “the entire flow of the Nile water at Aswan to Egypt and 
Sudan” and reinforcing the 1929 treaty.105 The 1929 and 1959 Nile 
Water Agreements do not differ greatly. The 1959 Bilateral Agreement 
simply accounts for vast political changes in the region and 
agricultural demands. According to the 1959 Bilateral Agreement, the 
Nile’s average flow was 84 billion cubic meters per year. Of these 84 
billion cubic meters, evaporation and seepage accounted for 10 billion 
cubic meters per year, and the remaining 74 billion cubic meters per 
year would be divided between Egypt and Sudan where Egypt would 
receive 48 billion cubic meters per year and 7.5 billion cubic meters 
per year in benefits. Sudan would acquire 4 billion cubic meters per 
year and 14.5 billion cubic meters per year in benefits.106 This 
essentially disqualified other upstream, riparian States from attaining 
water rights to the River Nile by only allocating 10% of the River Nile 
to upstream States.107 With downstream nations Sudan and Egypt 
obtaining water rights over the longest transboundary waterway in the 
world, Egypt continues to exercise its power by strategically citing the 
no-harm rule as an important source of customary international law to 
protect itself from any upstream hydroelectric construction that would 
 
101 See id.  para. 4, subsec. (i).   
102 M. K. Mahlakeng, China and the Nile River Basin: The Changing 
Hydropolitical Status Quo, 10 INSIGHT ON AFR. 73, 76–77 (Dec. 21, 2017). 
103 Id.   
104 Id. at 77.  
105 Id.  
106 Id.  










affect own developments. In contrast, Ethiopia has been unable to 
assert authority over the Nile river. 
  
As early as 1997 and 1998, Ethiopia’s Minister of Water 
Resources and foreign minister announced, respectively: 
 
As a source and major contribution of the Nile waters, Ethiopia has 
the right to have an equitable share of the Nile waters and reserves 
its rights to make use of its waters. There is no earthly force that can 
stop Ethiopia from benefiting from the Nile.108  
 
Today’s the GERD debate hinges on the question of whether the Nile 
Water Agreements are binding legal agreements upon upstream 
riparian nations like Ethiopia. If Egypt relies on the natural and 
historical rights asserted through the Nile Water Agreements, it is 
unlikely to make a compelling argument for controlling upstream 
development, given that the agreements were made and concluded 
without the participation of many upstream riparian nations.  
 
B. Ethiopian Arguments to Gain River Nile Access 
 
To justify its authority to build the GERD, Ethiopia repeatedly 
asserts its absolute, upstream authority to develop along the Nile, 
despite objections by its downstream neighbors Sudan and Egypt. 
Home to the White Nile’s origin, Ethiopia houses the majority of the 
White Nile’s waters within its highlands. Consequently, the upstream 
nation invokes a property right argument to the Nile’s waters to justify 
the GERD’s construction and Ethiopia’s exclusive management over 
the GERD. However, this claim raises entitlement questions based on 
the contentious principle of absolute sovereignty along an international 
waterway, garnering objections from diplomatic and legal circles. Like 
Egypt, Ethiopia’s most powerful claim stems from codified customary 
international water law through equitable utilization with an emphasis 
on Ethiopia’s scarce energy access.  
 
i. River Nile Ownership & The Ethiopian Highlands 
 
Ethiopia’s highlands supply about 86% of the water that the 
River Nile uses.109 Because the highlands flow into the Nile, Ethiopian 
 
108 Id. 
109 Ashok Swain, Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: 
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government officials claim, to an extent, ownership over the Nile and 
oppose Egyptian arguments that attempt to regulate Ethiopia’s GERD 
construction and filling. Ethiopia’s property right argument invokes a 
national sovereignty approach towards the GERD.  
 
Ethiopia’s argument raises many questions, particularly as it 
relates to which country may possess more or less of a transboundary 
waterway. When contemplating the property right of a transboundary 
waterway, is the property right attached to the land from which the 
water originates or the land that provides most of the water used? 
Similarly, does a property right originate from the land where most of 
the water flows or the land where most of the water is used? Ironically, 
by asserting an ownership right over a transboundary waterway to 
justify the GERD’s construction and exclusive control over that 
structure, the Ethiopian government mirrors the same flawed national 
sovereignty argument invoked by Egypt. Ethiopia would have a 
stronger argument by acknowledging an irrefutable co-riparian 
reliance.  
 
ii. Equitable Utilization & Poverty Alleviation  
  
Ethiopia’s use of equitable utilization to justify the GERD’s 
construction and exclusive management of the Dam is the nation’s 
strongest argument. It is no secret that Ethiopia has grappled with 
widespread poverty, particularly through food insecurity and 
malnutrition.110 However, the GERD’s potential to provide energy 
access for a considerable number of Ethiopians who remain off the 
nation’s power grid would enhance Ethiopia’s standard of living.111 
The GERD is an attempt to develop Ethiopia’s hydroelectric capacity. 
While Ethiopia’s highlands provide Ethiopians with an important 
water source, only about 3% of Ethiopia’s hydropower potential had 
been reached as of 2001.112 Historically, Ethiopians have relied on 
other alternative forms of energy that have been more harmful to the 
environment, including biofuel mass.113  
 
 
110 2020 Global Report on Food Crisis 2020, FOOD SECURITY 
INFORMATION NETWORK [FSIN] (2020), 
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC_2020_ONLI
NE_200420.pdf.  
111 See Kimenyi, supra note 18. 
112 See Kimenyi, supra note 2, at 106.  










Ethiopian circumstances certainly warrant invoking equitable 
utilization. Reaching Ethiopia’s untapped energy potential would also 
make a difference in local communities for millions of Ethiopians.114 
For instance, some Ethiopians are relying on their government’s 
promise that the GERD will generate electricity to power their 
businesses. As a result, individuals have poured their resources into 
business investments, anticipating the GERD’s positive benefits.115 
For them, the GERD’s failure would be a disaster to their livelihoods.  
 
Ethiopia also contends that the GERD’s construction could create 
benefits for the entire region, promoting equity. Through the GERD, 
Ethiopia expects to produce enough electricity for the entire nation 
with surplus amounts of energy, much of which could be exported and 
sold for affordable prices to neighboring countries that do not have 
substantial energy access.116 Energy sales could reach as far as China 
and Western Europe, particularly given the non-African support and 
financing of the GERD.117 Another benefit that Ethiopia cites is 
environmental. Although it cannot be said with complete certainty, 
simulations reveal that despite risks to Egyptian water supplies, the 
filling period of the reservoir could benefit Ethiopia and Sudan without 
significantly hindering Egyptian water users.118 However, subsequent 
multi-year droughts would need to be managed with careful 
coordination to avoid harmful impacts.119  
 
Under equitable utilization, Ethiopia is entitled to greater Nile 
access than through the anachronistic Nile Water Agreements. At the 
same time, Ethiopia’s current efforts to account for potential 
downstream harm within Egyptian borders are feeble and do not 
sincerely incorporate the no-harm rule. If Ethiopia were to successfully 
construct and fill its reservoir under the legal justification of equitable 
utilization, without restrictions upon Ethiopian management, new 
legal precedent could very well be established where international 
water law’s principle of equitable utilization no longer considers the 
no-harm rule essential.  
 
114 See Al Jazeera English, supra note 4.  
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116 See Kimenyi, supra note 18. 
117 See Kimenyi, supra note 2, at 106. 
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The GERD crisis has pushed legal proponents and opposition 
to the Dam to explore diverse legal justifications. For each party in the 
conflict, the strongest legal justifications stem from codified 
international water law: equitable utilization and no-harm. With a 
focus on the effects of climate change upon Egypt, the desert nation 
could certainly invoke the no-harm rule to insist upon a quid pro quo 
solution. At the same time, Ethiopia’s economic and social 
circumstances warrant invocation of equitable utilization to increase 
its Nile access. Nevertheless, the legal community struggles to explain 
the interplay between no-harm and equitable utilization in practice.  
 
The concrete response to the GERD conflict could very well 
set the stage for new legal precedent that applies international water 
law to transboundary waterways. For instance, if the filling results in 
a disaster for Egypt, regional and international responses could call for 
greater emphasis upon the no-harm rule in the future. On the other 
hand, if the filling results in technological innovation and economic 
prosperity that overshadows Egyptian water use strife, equitable 
utilization could very well become completely divorced from the no-
harm rule. As circumstances evolve and climate change exacerbates 
environmental and economic situations along transboundary 
riverways, the legal community must confront a crucial legal question: 
how the two competing principles should interplay. Either way, the 
GERD’s filling and operation will help to answer that question and 
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